

# Japanese and American Colonial Assimilation through Education in Taiwan and The Philippines

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The colonial empires of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were most commonly established by strength of military force, yet the implementation of such force alone was insufficient to maintain a workable long-term imperial administration. Once a particular nation or region had been effectively subdued, the dominant imperial power found that more subtle means were required in order to pacify and thereby rule the subject population. Two such policies commonly employed were: 1) the coercion of the subject people often by way of co-opting its prior established social elite, and, 2) ultimately, the assimilation of the colonized population into the cultural fabric of the imperial power.<sup>1</sup> The use of such policies prompts interesting social, cultural, political, and economic questions relating to the dichotomy which arises from a two tier hierarchy – the essential question being, how do the colonizer and the colonized reconcile the differences which are necessarily inherent in the imperial-colonial relationship?

Historians today are beginning to examine the imperial-colonial relationship not simply from the one dimensional perspective of the colonizer, but rather scholars are now questioning how colonized people accommodated or even worked within the confines of their subject status to either maintain or forge their own established or nascent sense of

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<sup>1</sup> Harry J. Lamley gives the following succinct definition: 'Assimilation denotes the process by which cultures and peoples interact and fuse. Under colonialism this process entails the transformation of the languages, customs, habits and institutions of a subject people until they become more at one or merge with the nationals of the home country.' See, Harry J. Lamley, 'Assimilation Efforts in Colonial Taiwan: The Fate of the 1914 Movement,' *Monumenta Serica*, Vol. 29 (1970-1971), pp. 496-520

national identity.<sup>2</sup> This move away from the exclusive perspective of assumed 'imperial determinism' allows us to engage with a more nuanced appraisal of the colonial situation. Referencing the work of Octave Mannoni (1899-1989), a French psychoanalyst who spent more than twenty years in Madagascar, Remi Clignet asserts that 'colonization is the result of certain processes of economic and political development but colonial enterprises cannot take place without the recruitment of particular actors who are predisposed to play the roles expected of them.'<sup>3</sup> As such, he argues, 'the dialectics of the colonial situation' result in a 'double alienation':

The practices, ideologies, and philosophies imposed upon him [the colonized subject] are alien to his framework of reference and his own tradition. His first alienation results therefore from his exposure to educational and cultural stimuli that tend to erase the significance of his own past. But his second alienation results from the selective nature of the elements of the metropolitan culture with which he is confronted. The machinery, the books, the movies, the curricula, and the labor force exported to the colonies reflect the specific needs experienced by the segments of the metropolitan society present on the local scene.<sup>4</sup>

Educational policy was often key to the assertion of colonial control, and, in many ways, an examination of this aspect of social policy can be used to determine, if not actually define, the general intentions of the colonizer's imperialist aims; and can even go so far as to inform, to certain extents, the subsequent socio-economic development of such regions in

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<sup>2</sup> Michael Adas, 'Imperialism and Colonialism in Comparative Perspective,' *The International History Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June, 1998), pp. 371-388; Michael C. Hawkins, "'Disrupted" Historical Trajectories and Indigenous Agency: Rethinking Imperial Impact in Southeast Asian History,' *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (October, 2007); Remi Clignet, 'Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Dilemmas of Colonizer-Colonized Relations,' *Comparative Educational Review*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (October, 1971), pp. 296-312

<sup>3</sup> Clignet, 'Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't,' p. 298

<sup>4</sup> Clignet, 'Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't,' p. 303

terms of state-formation and the post-colonial nation-building process.<sup>5</sup> The twentieth century witnessed the rapid expansion of universal education within ‘developed’ (i.e. industrialised) societies, and by extension to their ‘less developed’ colonies, fostering much debate regarding what types of educational movements were best suited to the shaping of a new *globalised* modernity.<sup>6</sup> The emergence of ideological imperatives, such as nationalism and Social Darwinism for instance, all vying for prominence, had a radical effect within the dynamics of a rapidly changing world order. Ideas of racial identity, particularly in terms of relative superiority versus inferiority, along with the *raison d’être* of the ‘civilising mission’ and the eponymous ‘white man’s burden’, arguably shaped and defined colonial ambitions during this high era of imperial expansion.<sup>7</sup> The Spencerian idea of ‘survival of the fittest’ was very much at the intellectual fore during this period, and consequently educational policy and its implementation becomes a practical tool in terms of social engineering.<sup>8</sup> Thus, to return to Remi Clignet: “‘Assimilation’ becomes the ideological framework within which the colonizer stresses the universality of his own culture, and reduces the aspirations toward upward mobility experienced by the colonized into individual rather than collective terms.”<sup>9</sup>

But how did ideas of assimilation through education play out for real in the historical context? In this essay, I aim to examine the attempts at social engineering and collective control implemented through the educational policies imposed upon the colonies of Taiwan

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<sup>5</sup> Philip G. Altbach & Gail P. Kelly (eds.), *Education and Colonialism* (New York & London: Longman, 1978), Introduction, pp. 1-44; Sureshachandra Shukla, ‘From Pre-Colonial to Post-Colonial: Educational Transitions in Southern Asia,’ *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 31, No. 22 (June, 1996), pp. 1344-1349

<sup>6</sup> For instance, the debate over ‘nationalism’ versus ‘internationalism.’ Should Imperial powers be culturally inward or outward looking? Questions of identity seem to have been constantly considered and re-evaluated throughout the colonial era: see, Mark E. Lincicome, ‘Nationalism, Imperialism, and the Education Movement in Early Twentieth-Century Japan,’ *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (May, 1999), pp. 338-360

<sup>7</sup> Marc Frey, ‘Visions of the Future: The United States and Colonialism in Southeast Asia, 1940-1945,’ *Amerikastudien / American Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 3, Constructing Identities – Culture, Politics, Economics (2003), pp. 365-388; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘Becoming Japanese: Imperial Expansion and Identity Crises in the Early Twentieth Century,’ in Sharon A. Minichiello (ed.), *Japan’s Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900-1930* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998)

<sup>8</sup> See, The Hon. H.A. Wyndham, *Native Education: Ceylon, Java, Formosa, the Philippines, French Indo-China, and British Malaya* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933)

<sup>9</sup> Clignet, ‘Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t,’ p. 307

and the Philippines by the imperial powers of Japan and the USA respectively, and their post-colonial legacies.<sup>10</sup>

Japan and the USA have been described as 'late-comers' to the colonial age.<sup>11</sup> Superficially, they perhaps appear to represent two very different forms of imperialism. Yet, in looking specifically at their respective colonies of Taiwan and the Philippines, there are many interesting parallels which can be made. Both colonies were diplomatically acquired as the outcome of war settlements, and both then required concerted military campaigns to secure as territorial possessions. Taiwan was ceded to Japan as part of the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) at the end of the first Sino-Japanese War. The island, which was the first territorial possession acquired in Japan's subsequent programme of colonial expansion, remained a Japanese colony for the following fifty years. The Philippines was ceded to the United States as part of the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1898) at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, and remained an American possession until 1946, when it was granted independence, with a brief interlude when the islands were occupied by Japanese forces during the Second World War. Both territories were seen by their respective imperial overlords as key assets, strategically positioned in terms of trade and defence in the Asia-Pacific region. Each territory was also taken from a pre-established imperial power rather than conquered as an independent sovereign principality *per se*, yet the inhabitants of each territory self-mobilised direct armed resistance to their new colonial masters which needed to be subdued and pacified.<sup>12</sup> A further similarity which both the

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<sup>10</sup> Numerous papers have been written on various specialist or niche aspects of this topic relating to these two regions, but the two most comprehensive surveys are: E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); and, Glenn Anthony May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913* (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1980)

<sup>11</sup> Kiichi Fujiwara, 'Introduction – The Tales of Two Empires: Japan and the US as Latecomers in Colonialism,' in Kiichi Fujiwara & Yoshiko Nagano (eds.), *The Philippines and Japan in America's Shadow* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011)

<sup>12</sup> In the case of the Philippines, the resistance efforts devolved into a protracted guerrilla war which lasted until 1902, and exacted a great loss of lives on both sides. An interesting archive of photographs taken by a Dutch Consul stationed in the Philippines which documents the transition from Spanish to American rule has recently been published: Otto van den Muizenburg, *The Philippines*

Japanese and Americans encountered in each territory was a mixed population, primarily consisting of settler and aboriginal societies. The aborigines presented a difficult challenge as they were widely perceived as wild and uncivilised savages, unruly tribes of head-hunters. Yet despite these closely paralleled similarities in terms of geography, population, strategic value, and the potentially abundant resources which each territory represented, Japan and the US approached the colonial development of these two regions with profoundly differing cultural aims. Consequently, these similarities provide a level basis for a potentially interesting exercise in colonial analysis, not least because their 'latecomer' status has been argued as predicating a more consciously *experimental* colonial endeavour.<sup>13</sup>

Examinations of early Japanese imperialism tend to emphasize the self-perceived importance of Japan's overseas economic expansion as a means of ensuring the security of the motherland, hence Japan is said to have pursued a policy of integration, through which Taiwan would perhaps eventually have become a part of the core Japanese polity, or, to put it another way – Taiwan was ultimately intended to become fully assimilated (*dōka*) with the Japanese nation.<sup>14</sup> Whereas, in direct contrast, the United States professed its ostensibly *benevolent* intentions towards the Philippines, initiating a programme of development whereby the archipelago would be nursed towards eventual independence under the tutelage of US administrators.<sup>15</sup> This openly avowed goal perhaps makes the US unique amongst the colonial powers. In order to understand these two very distinct colonial administrations, we first need to examine how Japan and the USA arrived on the imperialist scene.

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*Through European Lenses: Late 19<sup>th</sup> Century Photographs from the Meerkamp van Embden Collection* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2008)

<sup>13</sup> Samuel P.S. Ho, 'The Development Policy of the Japanese Colonial Government in Taiwan, 1895-1945' in Gustav Ranis (ed.), *Government and Economic Development* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 288; Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990), pp. 12-13

<sup>14</sup> Hyman Kublin, 'The Evolution of Japanese Colonialism,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (October, 1959), pp. 67-84

<sup>15</sup> Stuart Creighton Miller, "*Benevolent Assimilation*" *The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1982); Karnow, *In Our Image*

From the outset Japan was very much an *assertive* colonial power – overtly setting out to forge for itself an overseas empire; whereas the US was almost an *accidental* colonial power, arguably finding itself the inheritor of certain colonial possessions in the wake of the successful defeat of Spanish military forces in these particular regions.<sup>16</sup> Yet once embarked upon the colonial mission, these two powers found that they each encountered the same set of challenges, and, to a large extent, whilst their ultimate aims may have been different, their initial attitudes and approaches were broadly similar.<sup>17</sup>

I have already mentioned that Social Darwinian ideas were very much to the intellectual fore at the time these two ‘latecomers’ joined the ranks of the imperialists. Such nations, perceiving themselves as more civilised, frequently professed that it was their *duty* to take ‘less civilised’ peoples in hand in order to ‘lift’ them for their own good; to tutor them and thereby impart moral and technological knowledge which would help these ‘backward’ societies to improve their lives through better sanitation and health practices; more rational and scientific education; better agricultural techniques; the rule of law; and, centralised economic reforms. Yet, seen more cynically, it was generally an expedient excuse for the appropriation of natural and human resources – the direct exploitation of the weak by the strong. Generally, what began as loosely organised expeditions of capitalist entrepreneurial adventurers soon consolidated into rigid, militarily-backed political bureaucracies in countries and regions where they proved to be most profitable. As Chang Han-Yu and Ramon H. Myers have observed: ‘Colonial policy and administration have seldom been the product of systematically planned programs carefully conceived before the

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<sup>16</sup> James B. Crowley, ‘An Empire Won and Lost,’ *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No.1 (Winter, 1982), pp. 122-132; Thomas R. McHale, ‘American Colonial Policy Towards the Philippines,’ *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (March, 1962), pp. 24-43

<sup>17</sup> This is not meant to imply that at this particular time there were no parties within both Japan and the USA who questioned or objected to these moves towards imperialism, as there certainly were such opponents in each nation: see, Mark R. Peattie, ‘Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895-1945,’ in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Karrow, *In Our Image*, p. 10-12

acquisition of the colony. Instead, basic ideas for development have often flowed from the fertile minds of a few technicians sent out early to put the colony in order.<sup>18</sup>

In the case of Taiwan, it was the early administrators, General Kodama Gentarō (1852-1906) and Gotō Shimpei (1857-1929), who shaped Japan's development of the colony, making Taiwan a self-supporting economic asset to the mother country in just nine years.<sup>19</sup> Gotō 'described his philosophy of colonial administration as "biological politics", subscribing to the belief that to survive one must adapt to one's environment, which implies a knowledge of one's environment as well as the taking of measures to adjust to the environment.'<sup>20</sup> A contemporary guidebook fairly effectively sums up the rather jingoistic colonial worldview as it was being applied to the newest member of the colonial club:

Ethnologically Formosa [Taiwan] is highly interesting; many of the wild tribes (which still hold considerable of the island territory) are bloodthirsty head-hunters who make it their business and pleasure to lie in wait, slay, and decapitate the domesticated savages, the Japanese, and the Chinese who work near the GUARD-LINE. Many of the semi-barbarous Chinese themselves are said to be murderous as well as hominivorous; exhibiting their cannibalistic tendencies by eating portions of the bushmen they succeed in killing. To save themselves and their subjects from being slaughtered and beheaded, the Japanese must either civilise or destroy the wild tribes, and the war of regeneration or extermination is being conducted with characteristic Japanese vigor.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Han-Yu Chang & Ramon H. Myers, 'Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship,' *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (August, 1963), pp. 434

<sup>19</sup> See, Yosaburo Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa* (London & New York: Longmans Green, 1907), pp. 9-10; Ho, 'The Development Policy of the Japanese Colonial Government in Taiwan, 1895-1945', pp. 287-331

<sup>20</sup> Ho, 'The Development Policy of the Japanese Colonial Government in Taiwan, 1895-1945', p. 288

<sup>21</sup> Philip Thomas Terry, *Terry's Japanese Empire, including Korea and Formosa* (London & Cambridge MA: Constable & Co., 1914), pp. 769

The guidebook goes on to describe in great detail the containment policy which was implemented by way of this armed 'Guard-line' (*Aiyu-sen*), which was essentially a barbed wire fence, electrified in places and seeded with landmines; armed guard posts were also set at intervals along its line. The guidebook adds an interesting note, however, that: 'A thousand children are being taught at 45 schools established in the guard stations, and, whenever possible, the authorities take batches of natives on a junket to Japan, to show them how intelligent people live.'<sup>22</sup>

Gotō was opposed to the idea of keeping the aboriginal population confined to a permanent reservation (as with the US Government's policy towards its Native American population). Instead, he sought to assimilate the Taiwanese aborigines and the Chinese settler communities into the colony by inculcating the basic rudiments of Japanese culture through a programme of education.<sup>23</sup> As with many of the Western imperial powers before them, the Japanese saw assimilation through education as the clearest goal of their 'civilising mission.' Writing in 1907, Takekoshi Yosaburo stated that:

Education has a great future before it in Formosa. In fact, it may be looked upon as the most important means of civilising the island. If the inhabitants are ever to be raised to a higher level, their customs and manners must be entirely changed; but this can only be effected by giving them such an education as will work a complete transformation in their characters.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Terry, *Terry's Japanese Empire*, p. 770

<sup>23</sup> P. Kerim Friedman, 'Entering the Mountains to Rule the Aborigines: Taiwanese Aborigine Education and the Colonial Encounter,' in Ann Heylen & Scott Sommers (eds.), *Becoming Taiwan: From Colonialism to Democracy* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010), pp. 19-32; see also, Paul Barclay, "'They Have for the Coast Dwellers a Traditional Hatred": Governing Igorots in Northern Luzon and Central Taiwan, 1895-1915,' in Julian Go & Anne L. Foster (eds.), *The American Colonial State in the Philippines and Japan in the Philippines: Global Perspectives* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 217-255; Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, Chapter XIV: The Savages & Their Territory

<sup>24</sup> Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, p. 293



The Americans professed much the same mission for the Philippines. As the American Senator, Albert J. Beveridge proclaimed: “[God] has made [the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples] adept in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples. And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world.”<sup>25</sup> But such racial prejudice was not limited to white nations only. Even though the Japanese professed to appeal to their fellow Asians in a spirit of ‘Pan-Asian’ unity, Takekoshi wrote condescendingly that:

The Chinaman worships money, and is ready to sacrifice everything, even life itself, if by so doing he can add to his hoard. This has made him the laughing-stock of the world; but if we look below the surface, we discover that this inordinate greed is but the natural outcome of his social surroundings and of his religious beliefs. The upper classes, seeing the utter corruption of their rulers, have lost all hope. They are disgusted with everything, and so try to find happiness by drowning themselves in wine and stuffing themselves with pork.<sup>26</sup>

The Japanese themselves had ably met and stayed the threat of this Western imperial advance by instigating a massive programme of reforms following on from the Meiji Restoration in 1868. These sweeping and profound social and political reforms enabled the Japanese to rapidly modernise, and so shaped their polity into a distinctly modern nation state. Indeed, if China was commonly perceived as ‘the sick man of Asia,’ then the Japanese undoubtedly thought of themselves as a shining beacon of modernity and surely an example for the rest of the region to emulate. Terry’s guidebook provides an interesting pen-portrait

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<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Paul D. Hutchcroft, ‘Colonial Master, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913,’ *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (May, 2000), p 277; Beveridge’s views here are mirrored exactly by those of the contemporary American political scientist, John Burgess: see, McHale, ‘American Colonial Policy Towards the Philippines’, pp. 29-30 (n.b. – square bracket insertions are Hutchcroft’s)

<sup>26</sup> Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, p 293; For a greater discussion of ‘Pan-Asianism’: see, Sven Saaler & Christopher W. Szpilman (eds.), *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Vol. 1 (1850-1920)* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011)

which clearly demonstrates this common contemporary perception whilst recounting the sights that were to be seen in Taiwan when travelling by railway to Tainan:

At certain of these southern stations various interesting racial types assemble to see the 'fire-spitting' engine of the 'foreign devil', and here the hybrid Chinese seem to take on a languorous, lackadaisical air, as if in tune with the lush tropics. Gay young silken-clad Lotharios with glossy black pig-tails, in which dainty ribbons are entwined and at the nether end of which an adorable true-love knot of baby-blue ribbon is tied, are conspicuous features in the crowds, as are also greasy paterfamilias who view the world through huge tortoise-shell goggles and go laden with baskets of fruit, or shiny, well-browned roasted ducks in split bamboo wickers. The men elbow the women aside in the most ruthless manner, with a keen eye for number one, and a large disdain for the hindermost. At all the big stations one sees the silent power behind the throne in the shape of spruce, helmeted, beleggined, gloved, dignified, ceremonious, but unfailingly helpful Japanese military men. Compared to the benighted islanders they seem like beings from another and brighter world – as in truth they are.<sup>27</sup>

At Gotō's instigation, the Japanese began their colonial administration in Taiwan by conducting a far reaching review of the territory, undertaking 'an investigation of the traditional laws and customs of the island, a land survey, and a population census.'<sup>28</sup> However, their designs for the islanders' assimilation into the Japanese system did not necessarily preclude their adoption of certain aspects of the existing culture which their investigations uncovered, particularly if it was something which could be turned to the

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<sup>27</sup> Terry, *Terry's Japanese Empire*, pp. 790-791. It is interesting here to note the demonstrative use of language to convey the sense that the colonized are idle, selfish, and effeminate, whereas the stentorian description of the colonizers reflects their admirably upright, civilised, orderly, no-nonsense, and therefore, naturally superior nature. These were common tropes at the time and were regularly used to justify the spread of colonialism

<sup>28</sup> Ho, 'The Development Policy of the Japanese Colonial Government in Taiwan, 1895-1945', p. 288

Japanese advantage. For instance, the Japanese discovered that they could reduce their initially very high investment requirements in maintaining a large police force on the island by co-opting and adapting the native *pao-chia* system which had originally been put in place by the Qing officials of the previous settler administration, who had transferred the system from mainland China.

The *pao-chia* system, as revived by the Japanese in Taiwan, was based on a shrewd practical knowledge of local customary obligations, such as those of kinship, that were most binding among the Taiwanese. It was an attack at the roots of opposition instead of at its symptoms. Under this system the people were made potential informers against their neighbors; in other words, they were forced to spy on themselves. It was essentially this system that made almost impossible any attempt at armed opposition.<sup>29</sup>

A similar kind of coercion was also employed by the Americans in the Philippines. Once they had finally suppressed the highly organised independent nationalist movement (who had originally welcomed the US forces as liberators, come to deliver them from three centuries of Spanish colonialism), the Americans soon set about consolidating their hold on the Philippines by integrating the former Filipino social elite into a new political system of the United States' own devising.<sup>30</sup> This new system of governance was to be modelled on distinctly modern lines, as Michael Hawkins describes:

At the foundations of the American colonial project was a profound trust and reliance on scientific methods and scholarly theories. Indeed, history itself was viewed as a quantifiable entity, which only required correct interpretation and accurate measurement to fully comprehend. If the United States were to succeed

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<sup>29</sup> Ching-Chih Chen, 'The Japanese Adaptation of the Pao-Chia System in Taiwan, 1895-1945,' *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (February, 1975), pp. 402-403

<sup>30</sup> William J. Pomeroy, *The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration, and Resistance!* (New York: International Publishers, 1992)

where Spain failed, it would be precisely because of its highly academic approach to governance.<sup>31</sup>

As was the case with the Japanese administration in Taiwan, the Americans operating in the Philippines, and their pro-imperial lobbyists back home, also adhered to the prevailing tenets of Social Darwinism, thereby employing overtly racist theories to back up their own colonial intentions. As has already been stated, some of the United States' leading social thinkers of the day even went so far as to claim that these ideas effectively 'pre-destined' the American people towards a pre-eminent cultural and political role in leading the world to a modern future.<sup>32</sup>

It is interesting to note here that, as their colonial projects advanced, both of these 'latecomers' to colonialism progressively turned to the newly burgeoning field of ethnology in support of their assimilationist goals.<sup>33</sup> In this way, they each sought to subvert notions of race, culture, and ethnicity toward their own ends. The Japanese looked to a wider understanding of race as a single 'Pan-Asian' concept encompassing multiple ethnicities (*minzoku*), in which the various Asian peoples would be brought under the protective wing of the Japanese Empire, where they could ultimately be unified within a common superior culture. Naturally, this dominant culture would take the form of Japanese language and customs – the Japanese then believing themselves to be representative of the absolute

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<sup>31</sup> Michael Hawkins, 'Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines Muslim South,' *The Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (October, 2008), p. 416

<sup>32</sup> McHale, 'American Colonial Policy Towards the Philippines,' pp. 24-43. Such racism was not altogether new to the peoples of the Philippines, it had also been characteristic of the Spanish colonial administration: see, Karl Schwartz, 'Filipino Education and Spanish Colonialism: Toward an Autonomous Perspective,' *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Colonialism and Education (June, 1971), pp. 202-218

<sup>33</sup> Hawkins, 'Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines Muslim South,' p. 416; see also, Kevin M. Doak, 'Building National Identity through Ethnicity: Ethnology in Wartime Japan and After,' *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter, 2001), pp. 1-39; Daniel P.S. Goh, 'States of Ethnography: Colonialism, Resistance, and Cultural Transcription in Malaya and the Philippines, 1890s-1930s,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (January, 2007), pp. 109-142

pinnacle of Asian cultural evolution.<sup>34</sup> George Kerr, a contemporary commentator writing in 1942, referring to the Japanese 'southward policy', states that: 'It seems like reading extracts from a Far Eastern version of *Mein Kampf* to read some [of their] published pronouncements on expansion.'<sup>35</sup> By way of example, he goes on to cite the following translation from a Japanese publication of 1938:

... Japan's development in the scientific and chemical world has focussed her attention on Taiwan, not merely as an overseas possession but as an integral part of the Japanese Empire. Thus arose the necessity for Japan to establish her southern policy with Taiwan as her base of operations in the south. The keynote of her southern policy may be given as follows:

1. Japan cannot expect to be self-supporting economically by simply forming an economic bloc with Manchukuo and China; she needs to embrace in that bloc the territory of the southern tropical zone.
2. It is absolutely necessary for Japan to make a southward economic expansion, on a pure basis of co-prosperity and co-existence, with people to be contacted ... This southern policy should be carried out together with her continental policy, which includes Manchukuo and China, in order to safeguard herself, and for the preservation of peace in the Far East ...<sup>36</sup>

Kerr concludes by describing Taiwan as 'a sociological laboratory for the "master-race" technique.'<sup>37</sup> Indeed, the primary areas of development that the Japanese first engaged with were agriculture and education, as well as rapidly creating the necessary support

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<sup>34</sup> Li Narangoa & Robert Cribb, 'Introduction: Japan and the Transformation of National Identities in Asia in the Imperial Era,' in Li Narangoa & Robert Cribb, *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945* (Routledge Curzon, London & New York: 2003), pp. 1-22

<sup>35</sup> George H. Kerr, 'Formosa: Colonial Laboratory,' *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (February, 1942), p. 51

<sup>36</sup> Hideo Naito (ed.), 'Taiwan, A Unique Record' (Tokyo: Kokusai Nippon Kyokai, 1938), quoted in Kerr, 'Formosa: Colonial Laboratory,' p. 51.

<sup>37</sup> Kerr, 'Formosa: Colonial Laboratory,' p. 55.

infrastructure. The first chief of educational affairs, Izawa Shūji (1851-1917), had idealistic aspirations for the introduction of universal education for all of the island's Taiwanese population. However, this hope was curbed by a more pragmatically-minded Governor-General Kodama, who decreed that while universal education was the long term goal they would begin by limiting the establishment of schools to 'areas where the wealthy Taiwanese were able and willing to pay most of their costs.'<sup>38</sup> The schools were open to all social and economic ranks of Taiwanese society, but Kodama and Gotō were particularly keen to prevail upon the gentry class to send their offspring to these new schools. The members of the native scholar-gentry were initially reluctant to do so, and many leading Taiwanese scholars rejected invitations to teach Chinese studies in the government schools, preferring instead to continue their instruction in the old-style Chinese schools, thereby keeping alive their own traditions. However, as Patricia Tsurumi describes, these old-style schools began to decline after the first two decades of Japanese rule as the provision of government schools began to increase and slowly took hold.<sup>39</sup> Whilst this shift may seem to indicate the growing success of the Japanese educational programme, it did not necessarily imply that the Taiwanese were coming to terms with Japanese rule, or the adoption of Japanese culture. As Tsurumi observes:

Not only did many gentry members have reservations about the nationalistic Japanese tone of much that was taught, they also were uneasy about the stress on Western science as well. Even prominent Taiwanese who got along well with the authorities would sometimes publicly lament the new educational trends that drew youth away from the traditional intellectual preoccupation with literary refinement and moral virtue.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> E. Patricia Tsurumi, 'Education and Assimilation in Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945,' *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1979), p. 618

<sup>39</sup> Tsurumi, 'Education and Assimilation in Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945,' p. 619

<sup>40</sup> Tsurumi, 'Education and Assimilation in Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945,' p. 620

In time, the schooling system was developed such that the introduction of 'college level institutions to produce specialists in agricultural, forestry, commercial and engineering trades' began to raise the levels of vocational education for the native population.<sup>41</sup> However, the programme of education remained a two-tier system with the provision of schooling for the subject Taiwanese population being kept strictly secondary to that given to the ruling Japanese class. Eventually, as the development of the colony progressed, the systems became somewhat more integrated, particularly during the war effort of the early 1940s, when there was an urgent movement (*kōminka*) to intensify the assimilation of Japanese colonial subjects throughout the empire.<sup>42</sup> But, the main predicament which many Taiwanese found themselves in was one of 'trapped mobility.'<sup>43</sup> As Ann Heylen describes:

By 1915, the Taiwanese had lost their innocence and had come to accept that the colonial administration was not there to look after local interests. Taiwanese were deprived of equal opportunities with Japanese residents, and treated as second rate citizens. Educational facilities in the colony were limited to the training of teachers and medical personnel. The job market was heavily regulated and better positions went through the hands of Japanese colonial officials. Cooperation and credentials from the colonial administrators were vital in this kind of local job market. Chances for promotion were rare, reflecting a state of trapped mobility. For most Taiwanese the reality of this trapped mobility was part of the reality of colonial existence, and there was little one could do to avoid it without extra help

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<sup>41</sup> Tsurumi, 'Education and Assimilation in Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945,' p. 622

<sup>42</sup> *Kōminka* was the radical suppression of native culture through the direct imposition of Japanese culture by way of four specific programmes: 1) forcing colonial subjects to exclusively adopt the Japanese language, 2) forcing them to take Japanese names, 3) forcing them to adopt the Japanese religion (*Shinto*), and, 4) requiring them to volunteer for service in the Japanese military: see, Wan-yao Chou, 'The *Kōminka* Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations,' Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996)

<sup>43</sup> Ann Heylen, 'Reflections on Becoming Educated in Colonial Taiwan,' in Ann Heylen & Scott Sommers (eds.), *Becoming Taiwan: From Colonialism to Democracy* (Wiesbaden: HarrassowitzVerlag, 2010), pp. 149-164

from a beneficiary or willingness to go to Japan to pursue higher and better education.<sup>44</sup>

Taiwanese who were able to travel to Japan for schooling found a very different environment and a markedly improved quality of education there. It also opened them up to contact with other nationalities – particularly Chinese and Koreans. As Heylen points out, this led some of them to question and re-evaluate what it meant to be Taiwanese. Mixing with other nationalities was a natural catalyst – '[w]ith the Koreans, they shared a colonial present, and with the Chinese a cultural past' – but also their interactions with the Japanese, and how they were perceived in the colonial *metropole*, had a profound effect upon their sense of identity.<sup>45</sup> Despite adopting Japanese ways – in terms of dress, etiquette, customs, language – a certain sense of alienation often lingered. Equality was perhaps key to the ultimate success or failure of assimilation. Yet parity between the colonizer and colonized was not something which was usually forthcoming. Heylen cites the example of one Taiwanese scholar, Zhang Shenqie (1904-1965), who wrote of his experiences studying in Japan and his internal conflicts wrestling with his cultural identity as a colonial subject:

It was now that I felt the pain of being a citizen of a conquered people (wangguonu). I thought: as a conquered people, you have now become a servant of the conquerors. No matter your capacities or knowledge, it is to no avail, conquered people should not be equal to the citizens who have a country, a servant should not be on the same level as the master. The wish for equality, for wanting to be on the same level, turned into rebellion (panni). Even though I did

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<sup>44</sup> Heylen, 'Reflections on Becoming Educated in Colonial Taiwan,' p. 151

<sup>45</sup> Heylen, 'Reflections on Becoming Educated in Colonial Taiwan,' p. 152



not have a strong consciousness, in my heart I realized that I could not have the same thoughts as the Japanese people.<sup>46</sup>

This socio-cultural disparity – which could perhaps be characterised as embodying an established Confucian notion of the older brother acting as senior and mentor to an inferior younger brother – also finds a mirror in the American educational programme which was being implemented in the Philippines. As Hugh Wyndham describes:

The Americans lost no time in beginning their crusade in education. No time could be lost if they were to bring social conditions up to the standard required of their programme. The batteries in Manila were hardly silent when the American soldier turned schoolmaster. Within three weeks of the occupation of Manila seven schools were reopened and a teacher of English was installed each under the supervision of the Chaplain of the First Californian Volunteer Infantry.<sup>47</sup>

The level of acculturation required in order to successfully assimilate the Filipinos with US ideals was perhaps less radical than it might have been due to the previous Spanish presence. The Filipino populations were already used to Western customs and ideas, and they were certainly very familiar with the Christian religion – even if it was of a different denomination. Yet a parallel with the Taiwanese (Confusionist) example may perhaps be found in a similar ‘elder brother / younger brother’ attitude on the part of the colonizer. The first US Governor-General of the Philippines, William Howard Taft (1857-1930), frequently referred to the Filipino population as America’s ‘little brown brothers,’ a phrase telling of

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<sup>46</sup> Shenqie Zhang, *Lichengbei – you ming: heise de taiyang* (Taizhong: Shenggong Chubanshe, 1961), p. 76, quoted in Heylen, ‘Reflections on Becoming Educated in Colonial Taiwan,’ p. 158; Similar sentiments were expressed by Filipinos too: see, Karnow, *In Our Image*, p. 17

<sup>47</sup> Wyndham, *Native Education*, p. 121

both racial prejudice as well as a typically belittling, or infantilising, colonial rhetoric.<sup>48</sup> Indeed, Taft openly spoke of Filipinos as being ‘in many respects nothing but grown up children.’<sup>49</sup> It is unsurprising then that the Americans saw their role primarily as that of teachers – offering a more *paternal* rather than *fraternal* sense of care – in accord with President McKinley’s remarkable proclamation of ‘benevolent assimilation,’ which he issued in December 1898.<sup>50</sup> Civilian teachers were sent out to replace the soldiers, tenaciously attempting to spread their teaching activities into remote and often still hostile areas.<sup>51</sup> Their main tasks were to instruct and supervise the native teachers whom they had recruited: ‘Often a [Filipino] teacher taught one week what he himself had acquired but the week before.’<sup>52</sup> This being a doubly-difficult task when one considers the fact that all teaching was required to be conducted in English, a language which was equally as new to the Filipino teachers as it was to their pupils. Nevertheless, the American programme of education was deemed to have been highly successful because the Filipinos proved very amenable to it. This was probably attributable to the appointment of several very competent directors of the US education bureau, who were responsible for the oversight of

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<sup>48</sup> Karnow, *In Our Image*, p. 174; Perhaps unsurprisingly, this pejorative/condescendingly-affectionate phrase permeates down even into the memoirs of the American school teachers who operated in the Philippines, for instance: see, William B. Freer, *The Philippine Experiences of an American Teacher: A Narrative of Work and Travel in the Philippine Islands* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1906)

<sup>49</sup> Quoted in May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, p. 10

<sup>50</sup> See, James H. Blount, *American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912* (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1913); The full text of the proclamation is given in Chapter VIII, pp. 147-150; it is interesting to note the persistence of the schoolhouse as colonial metaphor even as late as 1939 in American cultural representations of the Philippines in movies such as *The Real Glory*, the opening scenes of which feature a US school in which Filipino children are being taught; for a more in-depth examination of this trope than space permits to give here: see, Charles V. Hawley, ‘You’re A Better Filipino Than I Am, John Wayne: World War II, Hollywood, and U.S.-Philippine Relations,’ *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 71, No. 3 (August, 2002), p. 406

<sup>51</sup> See, Charles Edward Russell, *The Outlook for the Philippines* (New York: Century, 1922), pp. 227-231, for an account of four teachers who were kidnapped and murdered in northern Luzon after travelling for many days cutting their own paths through the jungle whilst attempting to reach their first posting in 1902; the remoteness of the area meant that they were not missed for several months

<sup>52</sup> Russell, *The Outlook for the Philippines*, p. 236

the territory's schools and curriculum. In the early years, these were: Fred Atkinson, 1900-1902; Elmer Bryan, 1902-1903; David Barrows, 1903-1909; and, Frank White, 1909-1913.<sup>53</sup>

David Barrows (1873-1954) perhaps stands out from this group. He was very much an 'ethnographer-official,' holding graduate degrees in both education and anthropology.<sup>54</sup> He implemented a temporary move away from 'industrial education,' a policy which was seen as important to American market interests in the colony's development, to one of 'literary education,' which focussed more upon the personal and cultural development of the individual.<sup>55</sup> As Glenn Anthony May describes him: 'Barrows was fundamentally a Jeffersonian. Like Thomas Jefferson, he believed that universal education was the necessary precondition for the success of popular government.'<sup>56</sup> Consequently, the American teachers serving under Barrows were not sent out simply as educators, they were also tasked with sociological fact-finding, helping to build up an ethnographic portrait of the colony which in turn could better inform the American administrators.

In dealing with the aboriginal population in the Philippines, as with Gotō in Taiwan, Barrows rejected the idea of reservations, having previously been sent to study the Native American reservations in the USA firsthand.<sup>57</sup> Instead, employing an ethnographically informed approach, Barrows viewed the aborigines and the Muslim populations of the south:

... not [as] savages but [as] orientals whose independent rise to civilization had reached its finality and was now in retrogression, deserving therefore to be

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<sup>53</sup> See, May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*

<sup>54</sup> Goh, 'States of Ethnography,' p. 109; See also, May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, Chapter 6, pp. 97-112

<sup>55</sup> May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, Chapter 7, pp. 113-126; Glenn Anthony May, 'The Business of Education in the Colonial Philippines. 1909-30,' in Alfred W. McCoy & Francisco A. Scarano (eds.), *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2009), pp. 151-162

<sup>56</sup> May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines*, p. 98

<sup>57</sup> Goh, 'States of Ethnography,' p. 123

supplanted by the superior civilization offered by the Anglo-Saxon American. They were to be assimilated into mainstream Filipino society and civilized.<sup>58</sup>

Again, here, we can see the rhetoric of the 'civilising mission' as the initial impetus in justifying the colonial project. But, just as with Taiwan, the vicissitudes of wider political realities, both at the colonial *metropole* hub and in the broader *global* jockeying for position which was playing out between the various colonial powers, would eventually intercede. As with all colonies, the base line in maintaining an overseas empire was simply to support the imperialist centre.

Assimilation could perhaps only ever be a precarious balancing act for the colonizer. The need to draw the colony in, such that the colonized perceived the benefits of their subject status; and yet, simultaneously attempting to keep them sufficiently nested on the periphery, so that they could not threaten to overwhelm the pristine core of the 'superior' culture, was nigh impossible. Japan and the US both ultimately lost or relinquished their colonial status. However, the effects of their assimilation programmes continue to exert an influence on the post-colonial societies which have since emerged in both Taiwan and the Philippines.

In the case of Taiwan, the programme of assimilation instigated at the outset of the Japanese administration, was perhaps only a qualified success. There were two specifically concerted efforts mounted towards this particular aim. The first was in 1914, backed by a liberal Japanese elder statesman, Itagaki Taisuke (1837-1919), was very much supported by Taiwanese political elements attempting to work within the Japanese system. However, it was very swiftly and quietly suppressed by the Japanese authorities.<sup>59</sup> Consequently, the second programme, the *Kōminka Movement*, which was implemented by the Japanese

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<sup>58</sup> Goh, 'States of Ethnography,' p. 130

<sup>59</sup> See, Lamely, 'Assimilation Efforts in Colonial Taiwan'; Edward I-te Chen, 'Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937,' *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (May, 1972), pp. 477-497

authorities during the war years quite reasonably encountered resistance from the Taiwanese who had grown disillusioned with Japanese rule following the failure of the 1914 initiative. The change in policy had encouraged Taiwanese to look more favourably towards the ideals of nationalism and Woodrow Wilson's ideas of 'national self-determination.'<sup>60</sup> But such aspirations were largely swept aside by the brutalities which followed in the wake of the island's return to China at the close of the Second World War, and then even moreso with the subsequent retreat of the Nationalist Government to Taiwan in 1949, following the successful Communist takeover of the mainland. The tumultuous acculturation processes which the Taiwanese were subjected to under the Japanese, and then subsequently under the Nationalist Chinese, along with the widening politico-cultural differences with mainland China in more recent decades, have arguably left the native Taiwanese culturally dispossessed. Consequently, there now is a curious nostalgia which lingers for the stability experienced during the early Japanese period, which arguably today lends itself towards a residual affinity towards Japan.<sup>61</sup>

In the Philippines, US economic and military concerns have very evidently prevailed. For all the political rhetoric of benevolence, democracy, and freedom, when the Americans eventually withdrew, they left in place a highly autocratic system centred on the pre-existing Filipino social elite, who were content to maintain a 'patron-client' relationship with their former colonial masters in return for free trade with US markets and substantial rents for hosting large US military bases in 'independent' Philippine territory.<sup>62</sup> Again, the iniquities of the colonial era were perhaps to a certain extent expunged by the brutal treatment the

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<sup>60</sup> Erez Manela, 'Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the Revolt against Empire in 1919,' *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 111, No. 5 (December, 2006), pp. 1327-1351

<sup>61</sup> See, Peng-Er Lam, 'Japan-Taiwan Relations: Between Affinity and Reality,' *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Winter, 2004), pp. 249-267; Chih-Huei Huang, 'The Transformation of Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan in the Post-colonial Period,' in Li Narangoa & Robert Cribb, *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945* (Routledge Curzon, London & New York: 2003), pp. 296-314

<sup>62</sup> Julian Go, 'Introduction: Global Perspectives on the U.S. Colonial State in the Philippines,' in Julian Go & Anne L. Foster (eds.), *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 26-27

Philippines experienced during Japanese wartime occupation. Hence, a continuing affinity with their American former-colonial stewards, who essentially shaped the present Philippine nation into a kind of 'neo-colonial' satellite-state of the US, appears to persist with marginal resentment.<sup>63</sup>

In concluding this essay, I would like to return to Remi Clignet's 'double alienation' of the colonized. Regarding the relative experiences of Taiwan and the Philippines, as examined above, it is perhaps fair to say that whilst the colonized peoples of these two territories may well have become alienated from their pre-colonial pasts, their acculturation during their respective periods of colonial rule has undoubtedly shaped and defined their post-colonial national identities. For present day post-colonial regions, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, which have experienced multiple colonisations, this alienation becomes – in a subjective sense – highly nuanced. Sentimental colonialism, if one can call it that, is the kind of colonialism which, when viewed in retrospect, attempted to 'elevate' a subject people through education and assimilation, and, as the two case studies of Taiwan and the Philippines demonstrate, has resulted in a kind of sentimental legacy which continues to inform the post-colonial identities of Taiwanese and Filipinos alike.

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<sup>63</sup> See, Karnow, *In Our Image*, p. 23; Kathleen Weekley, 'The National or the Social? Problems of Nation-Building in Post-World War II Philippines,' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1, From Nation-Building to State-Building (2006), pp. 85-100; Fernando N. Zialcita, 'State Formation, Colonialism and National Identity in Vietnam and the Philippines,' *Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June, 1995), pp. 77-117; Ricardo T. Jose, 'Accord and Discord: Japanese Cultural Policy and Philippine National Identity during the Japanese Occupation (1942-1945),' in Li Narangoa & Robert Cribb, *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945* (Routledge Curzon, London & New York: 2003), pp. 249-269